Over the last decade or so Daniel Povinelli has written several thought-provoking and influential papers, both empirical and theoretical, on comparative developmental subjects, notably social cognition and self-recognition. In this volume he turns his attention to the realm of physical cognition, and provocatively claims that in spite of their impressive abilities to use tools, chimpanzees lack the ability to represent abstract causal variables between a tool and a goal object. Instead, chimpanzees' interactions with objects and their use of objects as tools reflect the execution of procedural rules about object relations that are directly perceived, and little more. Furthermore, careful experiments such as those described in this book reveal how the apes' reliance on visual configurations of objects, as opposed to a human-like appreciation of the true causal relations between objects, leads them to make fundamental and persistent errors when it comes to choosing between appropriate and inappropriate solutions to contrived tasks. In other words, chimpanzees' understanding of their tool use is not very different from that of monkeys, but it is fundamentally, qualitatively different from that of humans.
If you want a book that gives a thorough overview of the large literature on object manipulation and tool use by primates, discussing how studies from the field and captivity provide complementary and sometimes contradictory data sets, or how analyses of tool use may throw light on social, ecological and evolutionary mechanisms, this volume will disappoint. As a source of information about other people's work or about the range of analytical approaches to the use of tools by primates, it is of little value. On the other hand, if you want a detailed account of one laboratory's coherent research programme on tool use by one group of chimpanzees, spanning over two dozen experiments, all carefully controlled and clearly described with excellent illustrations, no other book comes near, with the possible exception of Kohler's classic The Mentality of Apes.
The book races into a critique of 'argument by analogy', the view that behavioural similarities imply mental similarities. Support comes in the form of a review of the social cognition studies by Povinelli's research group, concluding that in spite of their aptitude for gaze tracking, chimpanzees do not use others' gaze to attribute mental states. A brief account of Kohler's famous experiments then follows, along with a relatively uncritical review of recent work suggesting that human infants and young children understand more about causal mechanisms than was previously thought. A summary of Elisabetta Visalberghi's studies on capuchin monkeys' apparent lack of understanding of causal relations during tool use tasks finally sets the scene for the description of the long series of previously unpublished experiments by Povinelli and his collaborators, conducted over a period of 5 years. The problems presented to the chimpanzees include the 'trap-tube' and trap-table', 'inverted and broken rakes', and various problems involving pulling on ropes, hooking platforms that might bring food within reach, pulling on cloths that might support food, and tools that require modification or construction before they can be effective. There is no denying the care and ingenuity with which the experiments are carried out. At the same time, there is no denying that their zest for control of independent variables sometimes leads the experimenters along what looks (to the neutral onlooker) like some obviously blind alleys, at the expense of much more obvious, simpler and more pertinent (but never tested) alternatives. With each new chapter, the conclusions take on a certain inevitability, as time and time again the chimpanzees' performance turns out to be far below optimal, as the apes fail to adjust to experimental conditions that, it is implied, would pose few problems for any individual able to reason about nonobservable causal phenomena. The final chapter draws the project's findings together, attempts to meet some anticipated counterarguments, and relates the findings on tool use to currently available data on self-representation.
How to explain the chimpanzees' inability to pull preferentially on a cloth that partially supports an apple as opposed to one that similarly makes contact with the apple but does not support it? Why do the apes fail to choose to swing a hook around a post that is fixed to a platform on which a banana lies instead of a post that is clearly not fixed to the platform? According to Povinelli, it is because the chimpanzees' actions are dominated by the perception of 'visual contact', without any real understanding of the true underlying physical connection between the apple and the cloth or the post and the platform. Human adults and children, on the other hand, would have little problem in choosing the correct configuration, because of their more advanced 'folk physics'. But would they? In spite of what this book argues, we simply do not know the range of responses of humans faced with similar situations. It is implied that 3-year-old children have a vastly more elaborate knowledge of the world than chimpanzees. But how would children react to training on single-cloth or single-object conditions interspersed with occasional probe trials on which for no good reason they are confronted by two configurations that at least superficially look much the same, with no explanation of what they are to do? Maybe chimpanzees do not reason about unobservable causal events in the way adult humans do, but it remains to be clarified to what extent children do so.
Another issue concerns the extent to which the chimpanzees studied here are representative of the chimpanzee species. They were juveniles at the start of the project and had just reached adulthood by the end of it. Who knows how their cognitive abilities compare with those of older and vastly more experienced chimpanzees, especially those who are confronted with real-life problems requiring tool-aided solutions in the incomparably more complex environment of the natural habitat? Povinelli has argued that self-recognition develops in chimpanzees much later than it does in human infants, so it is surely conceivable that physical cognition continues to develop well into adulthood. (It has been suggested that some forms of tool use in the wild take up to 10 years to perfect.) Much more work needs to be done!
